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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.
TODD R. VAIL

:

Case No. 20001001-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
INTRODUCTION
The trial judge erred in concluding that Mr. Vail opened the door to Det. Braley's
opinion testimony on the truthfulness of the complainants. Parties can only invite the
admission of otherwise inadmissible opinion testimony if they mislead the jury or if they
themselves violate the ban on offering opinions on truthfulness. Here, defense counsel
did not suggest that the police questioned the victims' credibility nor did he elicit an
opinion on their truthfulness. He simply asked the police detective to identify factors in
investigating allegations of sexual abuse.
The trial judge further erred in ordering Mr. Vail to pay restitution for a crime for
which he did not admit responsibility. The law required the trial judge to specifically
determine whether Mr. Vail was admitting responsibility for abusing Brittany. In the
absence of any inquiry into Mr. Vail's understanding and intentions, the trial judge
plainly erred in imposing restitution.

I.

THE DEFENSE DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR FOR THE
STATE TO PRESENT INADMISSIBLE OPINION
EVIDENCE ON THE VICTIM'S TRUTHFULNESS

The State does not contest that Det. Braley offered her opinion on the
complainants' truthfulness. Rather, it claims that Mr. Vail opened the door to opinion
testimony. Under no scenario did the defense invite the prosecutor to elicit inadmissible
opinion evidence. The admission of that improper opinion testimony irreparably harmed
the defense in this close credibility contest.

A.

Because the Defense Never Implied that Det
Braley Doubted the Complainants'
Truthfulness, Misled the Jury, or Elicited
Opinion Testimony Itself, It Did Not Open the
Door to Inadmissible Opinion Testimony

The State asserts that it was entitled to admit Det. Braley's opinion on the
complainants' truthfulness because defense counsel suggested "that Detective Braley
personally questioned both victims' credibility because their disclosures of sexual abuse
arose in the context of a divorce proceeding." State's Brief at 9. The cases the State cites
hold that parties can open the door to the admission of opinion testimony if they falsely or
misleadingly suggest that a witness doubts the credibility of other witnesses. State v.
Baymon, 446 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1994) (false impression victim had been coached); State
v. Metzger, 4 P.3d 901, 905-06 (Wyo. 2000) (false suggestion that expert doubted
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victim's veracity). But, here, the defense made no such misimpressions.
On cross-examination of Det. Braley, defense counsel did not even hint that Det.
Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness. Instead, he elicited some of the factors
that the police consider in investigating abuse allegations:
Q. You indicated that you've - well, you've obviously
had a great deal of training in the area of child sexual abuse
and detection, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you understand that there are factors that you
also have to weigh in to determine whether a child has in fact
been coached or is not telling something that may be true,
correct?
A. Okay, yes.
Q. And certainly divorce situations could raise
eyebrows in certain circumstances, can't they?
A. Yes.
Q. Families where the children would be siding with
one parent as opposed to the other, and trying to gain favor
with that parent?
A. Correct.
Q. Those are indicators from your training that would
cause concern to any skilled investigator about the testimony;
is that a fair statement?
A. I would say that's a fair statement.
Q. There are numerous other ones, too, correct?
3

A. Correct.
Q. Including the age of the child, their experience,
things like that?
A. There's a lot of factors, yes.
R. 161: 126 (Addendum A).
As this examination shows, defense counsel never intimated that Det. Braley
"personally questioned both victims' credibility." State's Brief at 9. Defense counsel's
cross-examination may have implied that Det. Braley had not weighed the factors
properly or that she was not a "skilled" investigator, but he never misled the jury into
believing that Det. Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness. If anything, the fact
that Det. Braley pursued the charges even though the allegations arose in a divorce
context suggested that Det. Braley believed the complainants even though there was
cause for suspicion. Defense counsel did not open the door to the admission of
inadmissible opinion evidence. Baymon, 446 S.E.2d at 4; Metzger, 4 P.3d at 905-06.
Parties can also open the door to opinion evidence on truthfulness if they
themselves violate the ban on offering such opinions. State ex rel. E.D.. 876 P.2d 397,
402 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such violations occur when a party elicits a "subjective
credibility determination." State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ^[13. 5 P.3d 642. But, as the
excerpt quoted above demonstrates, defense counsel never elicited a subjective opinion
from Det. Braley of any kind. Because the defense adhered to the rules of evidence, the
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State lacked any opportunity to present Det. Braley's opinions.
Further contrary to the State's implications, challenging the credibility of
witnesses or offering motives for witnesses to lie do not open the door to opinion
evidence on truthfulness. State v. Maurer. 488 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
In State v. Cam 725 P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Or. 1986), for example, the defendant's stepdaughter accused the defendant of sexual abuse. The allegations arose after the defendant
and his wife accepted a new religion which promoted both parents disciplining their
children, rather than only the mother, as the parents had done previously. Id. at 1289.
The mother testified that the step-daughter and her sister "rebelled" following the
implementation of this discipline regimen, thus, implying that the girls had fabricated the
abuse allegations. Id The prosecution responded by presenting an aunt's testimony that
the step-daughter was honest and would not lie. Ld. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled
that in credibility cases such as sexual assault matters testimony "suggesting that another
witness is lying" or has a motive to fabricate does not open the door to opinion evidence
on truthfulness. Id. at 1291.
Similarly, in State v. Webb. 828 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Mont. 1992), a police informant
claimed that the defendant had purchased drugs from him. On cross-examination,
defense counsel extensively cross-examined the informant about his drug usage,
including on the night of the alleged purchase. IdL at 1356. The Montana Supreme Court
ruled that "neither contradictory evidence nor extensive cross-examination constitutes an
5

attack upon a witness' character for truth and veracity." Id It added, that "to conclude
otherwise would result in admitting opinion testimony regarding veracity in virtually
every case." Id. Defense counsel's challenging of Brittany's credibility and raising the
possibility that she had been coached no more invited opinion testimony on truthfulness
than did the cross-examinations in Carr and Webb.
Both this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's rulings are fully consistent with
these decisions. This Court unequivocally concluded in State v. Adams. 955 P.2d 781,
786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that a police officer had "improperly testified" about the
alleged victim's truthfulness even though the defense "assert[ed] its theory that [the
alleged victim] had been coached." On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court did not
fault the defense for presenting its theory, and, in fact, agreed that the police officer's
opinion testimony "violated rule 608(a) and that this error should have been obvious to
the trial court." State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, ^|20, 5 P.3d 642. Likewise, in State v.
Stefaniak. 900 P.2d 1094, 1095-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court acknowledged the
defense theory of fabrication based on rancorous divorce proceedings but, nevertheless,
ruled that the State had erroneously elicited opinion testimony.
The State dismisses these cases as dicta. State's Brief at 12-13. To the contrary,
just as in Adams and Stefaniak, because the defense did not misleadingly suggest that
Det. Braley doubted the complainants' truthfulness nor did it violate the ban on opinion
testimony itself, it did not open the door to the admission of opinion testimony.
6

B.

A More Favorable Verdict Was Likely Had the
Trial Judge Properly Excluded the
Inadmissible Opinion Testimony

Despite the State's protestations, the erroneous admission of Det. Braley's opinion
seriously undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. This Court has consistently ruled
that the admission of vouching evidence has a prejudicial effect on juries in sexual assault
cases involving close credibility determinations that arise during divorce proceedings.
Stefaniak. 900 P.2d at 1096; State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Reversal is required when, as here, credibility is determinative because there is no other
evidence to support the conviction. Iorg, 801 P.2d at 942.
The State asserts that Mr. Vail's statements alone were sufficient to support the
conviction. State's Brief at 14. To the contrary, Mr. Vail adamantly denied ever
touching Brittany or Kirstyn in a sexual manner and testified to that fact at trial. R. 161:
120-23; 162: 218; Addendum A. The fact that Mr. Vail claimed that Kirstyn was
"touchy" and would lay on him when giving him hugs does not support the allegations
that he sexually assaulted her. In fact, those admissions are consistent with Mr. Vail's
claims that he hugged the girls but never touched them sexually. Likewise, the showering
and bathing may have conflicted with social norms but did not constitute crimes. Neither
of the girls ever alleged that anything of sexual nature ever occurred while in the shower
or during a bath. Moreover, the girls never alleged that Mr. Vail ever exposed them to
pornography. These activities were completely separate and unrelated to the girls'
7

allegations.
The State similarly fails in its attempts to show that the divorce proceedings
provided no motive for the girls to lie. Both the girls and the grandmother harbored ill
feelings toward Mr. Vail. Brittany testified that she disliked Mr. Vail for disciplining her
and for his behavior toward Tracy. R. 161: 112-13. The grandmother openly admitted
that she resented Mr. Vail because she believed that he deprived her of contact with her
daughter and granddaughters. Moreover, the grandmother and the girls likely begrudged
Mr. Vail because Tracy had removed the girlsfromher home while she and Mr. Vail
attempted to reconcile. This decision sent the obvious message that Tracy valued Mr.
Vail more than her own mother and daughters.
The State makes much of fact the allegations arose after Tracy announced that she
and Mr. Vail were divorcing. State's Brief at 15-16. The timing of the announcement
supports rather than undermines the defense theory that the grandmother and the girls
falsely accused Mr. Vail. Out of loyalty to, respect for, or love of Tracy, the grandmother
and the girls may not have wanted to interfere with Tracy's and Mr. Vail's efforts to
resolve their marital difficulties. Tracy's decision to remove the girls from her home may
have also raised doubts about Tracy's loyalty to them. It should not be forgotten that
Tracy delayed a few weeks before informing her mother and daughters of her decision to
leave Mr. Vail. R. 161: 187. But, once Tracy chose her girls over Mr. Vail, the
grandmother and the girls were reassured that Tracy cared for them more than Mr. Vail.
8

The announcement of the divorce was an ideal time for the grandmother and the girls to
exact revenge and to ensure that Tracy did not waiver on her decision to choose her own
family over Mr. Vail. The fact that the allegations arose on the same day that Tracy
announced her decision confirms these inferences.
The grandmother had another obvious motive to fabricate. Although custody was
not at issue in the divorce, visitation rights remained to be addressed. The grandmother
admitted that her main complaint against Mr. Vail was her diminished opportunity to see
her granddaughters. By accusing Mr. Vail of sexually assaulting her granddaughters, the
grandmother could ensure that Tracy did not reconcile with Mr. Vail and that she would
see her family when she wanted.
Despite the State's efforts to show that Det. Braley's opinion did not influence the
jury's deliberations, the opposite is true. In the first place, it should be remembered that
the jury was hung rather than unanimous on the charge involving Brittany. Because only
one juror is needed to stymie a jury, this Court cannot infer that the jury as a whole
discredited Det. Braley's opinion testimony in reaching its verdict as the State would have
this Court believe. State's Brief at 16.
To the contrary, Det. Braley's expert-like opinion appears to have been decisive in
the jury's deliberations. Although the State correctly asserts that the prosecutor did not
mention Det. Braley during closing arguments, State's Brief at 16, the prosecutor's entire
theme centered on her assertion that the complainants "were telling the truth." R. 162:
9

230-34. Thus, the girls' credibility was the linchpin to the State's case.
Det. Braley's testimony directly addressed the complainants' credibility. The
prosecutor elicited that Det. Braley had investigated over 1500 instances of child abuse
and had interviewed more than 1000 child victims. Based on this extensive experience,
the jury certainly weighed her testimony heavily. As one court observed, "the testimony
of a police officer qualified as an expert on the investigation of sexual assault cases would
likely carry exceptional weight and an aura of reliability which could lead the jury to
abdicate its role in determining [the complainant's] credibility." Matter of G.M.P., 909
S.W.2d 198, 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
Rather than the jury disregarding Det. Braley's testimony in reaching its mixed
verdicts as the State proposes, the record indicates that weaknesses in Brittany's
testimony caused the jury to hang. Numerous problems plagued Brittany's testimony
including her repeatedly faulty memory and indications that she was looking for
assistance from others during her testimony. R. 161:88-94, 102-06. Although Kirstyn
also remembered few details about the allegations, her memory lapses were not as
pervasive and she did not look for guidance during her testimony. As the jury's verdict
indicates, she was a better witness than Brittany.
The key inquiry for this appeal is whether a different verdict is likely after
excluding Det. Braley's authoritative opinion. Separating Det. Braley's testimony leaves
behind a close credibility contest that arose where both the complainants and the
10

grandmother had significant incentives to fabricate. "Given the lack of real or physical
evidence, the jury's determination as to the credibility of the witnesses likely was the
determinative factor in its verdict." State v. Carr. 725 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Or. 1986).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Vail's convictions. Id.

IL

THE SENTENCING JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING
RESTITUTION WITHOUT ESTABLISHING THAT MR.
VAIL HAD ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ASSAULTING BRITTANY

In imposing restitution for Brittany, the sentencing judge failed to follow
established law. The sentencing judge never inquired about whether Mr. Vail was
admitting responsibility for a crime of which he was not convicted. Because the
sentencing judge plainly erred, this Court should reverse the restitution order.
Again, the State misconstrues the law in its analysis of this issue. The sentencing
judge did not "firmly establish^], much like a guilty plea,11 that Mr. Vail admitted
responsibility for abusing Brittany before imposing restitution. State v. Watson, 1999,
UT App 273, TJ5, 987 P.2d 1289; Addendum B. As the State's analysis demonstrates,
numerous inferences are necessary to even reach the conclusion that the sentencing judge
"implicitly" found that Mr. Vail admitted responsibility. State's Brief at 18-19.
This Court rejected similar reasoning in Watson. The defendant there pleaded
guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for her role in a homicide. 1999 UT App 273,

11

Tf2, 987 P.2d 1289. Specifically, she drove the perpetrators to and from the crime scene
and then sold the car used in the crime. Id. Although the defendant only admitted to
obstructing justice, the sentencing judge ordered her to pay restitution for the death of the
victim. Id. atffl[2,5. This Court ruled that because the sentencing judge could not
conclude that the defendant had admitted responsibility for the death "[w]ithout making
inferences,... there was no firmly established admission of responsibility upon which to
order . . . restitution.f! Id at ^[5.
Just as in Watson, the sentencing judge below had to make numerous inferences to
conclude that Mr. Vail admitted responsibility. Mr. Vail's failure to object to the
presentence report and his vague apologies at sentencing did not constitute a "firmly
established admission" because he never stated for what he was apologizing. Id. Only by
making inferences could the sentencing judge, who had not presided at trial, conclude that
Mr. Vail had agreed to pay restitution. Watson forbids such conduct.
The State argues that State v. Simonette, 881 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
supports the sentencing judge's restitution order. In thefirstplace, that case is of
marginal relevance because it was decided five years before Watson. In any event,
Simonette is readily distinguishable from this case because the defendant in that case
explicitly "admitted" in a presentence diagnostic evaluation that he committed an
uncharged offense. 881 P.2d at 964. In contrast, Mr. Vail never admitted to abusing
Brittany either in the presentence report or at sentencing.
12

This Court's holding in Watson seems to contemplate avoiding the very ambiguity
that occurred here. As the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated, ,f[t]he need for
evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is greater when specific factual issues
must be resolved." State v. Hammond. 2001 UT 92, f20,

P.3d

(internal

quotations omitted). Because the sentencing judge failed to inquire about Mr. Vail's
understanding, the judge lacked authority to impose restitutions payments to Brittany.
The State protests that the sentencing judge did not plainly err in imposing
restitution because although "the rule of law may have been obvious to the trial court, it
would not have been obvious to the trial court that defendant was not admitting
responsibility for sexually abusing both girls." State's Brief at 20. The State
misunderstands the plain error doctrine. An error is obvious, when the "law was clear at
the time of trial." State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19,1fl8, 18 P.3d 1123. Watson plainly
requires sentencing judges to unambiguously determine that criminal defendants admit
responsibility for crimes before imposing restitution.
In essence, the State argues that any error in imposing restitution was not obvious
to the sentencing judge because Mr. Vail did not object to the imposition of restitution.
This reasoning turns the plain error doctrine on its head. Under the State's approach, the
plain error doctrine is rendered meaningless because parties can only obtain relief,
regardless of established law and notions of fairness, if they specifically preserve all
issues.
13

To avoid such injustice, the plain error doctrine requires trial judges to know the
law and to enforce it. See, e.g.. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); Garcia,
2001 UT 19, TI18, 18 P.3d 1123. Placing the burden on judges sidesteps unfairly
punishing criminal defendants for not knowing their rights and for relying on the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-40. Because the sentencing
judge failed to apply well-settled law in imposing restitution, reversal is required.
Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1J6, 987 P.2d 1289.

CONCLUSION
Because the trial judge erroneously admitted opinion evidence that severely
prejudiced the defense and erroneously imposed restitution, this Court should reverse Mr.
Vail's convictions and remand this case for a new trial with instructions to eliminate the
restitution order with respect to Brittany.

Submitted, this 31st day of October, 2001.

feNT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

-120-

1

Q.

2

place?

3

A.

August 20th of 1999.

4

Q.

All right. At the time of interview did he indicate

5
6
7
8
9

Do you remember the date that that interview took

whether or not he and Tracy Ely were still living together?
A.

I believe at this time they had split up the first

part of August of 1999.
Q.

All right, and this was about the third week of

August?

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

And did you talk to him regarding that split at all?

12

A.

I did.

13

Q.

Did he indicate anything regarding what kind of

14
15
16
17
18

A.

That they were having communication problems.

He made

a reference to a sexual problem.
Q.

Okay.

After you got past the initial stuff, did you

I did.

20

Q.

And what was his response to your inquiry?

21

A.

He denied ever having any sexual feelings or sexual

24
25

1
J

go on tc specifically ask him about the allegations?
A.

23

1

problems they were having in the marriage?

19

22

j

contact with the girls.
Q.

Okay.

Now, we heard Brittney testify about this

showering with the defendant.
A.

Yes.

J

-1211 J

Q.

Did you ask him about that?

2

A.

I did,

3

Q.

Did you have that information from the girls?

4

A.

I did.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

showering?

8

A.

He indicated he had showered with the girls.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

I believe he said quite often.

11

Q.

All right, and did he indicate if Tracy ever showered

5

12

What was his response to your questions about

Did he indicate how often he had done that?

with the gir}.s?

13

A.

He did not.

14

Q.

Okay.

15
16
17

Did he indicate how old the girls were when he

was in the habit of showering with them?
A.

We discussed that Brittney was up to the age of 11 and

Kirsten was 7 or 8.

18

Q.

19

necessary?

20

A.

To conserve time in the evenings.

21

Q.

All right.

22

A.

To teach them how to wash.

23

Q.

All right.

24
25

Did he give you an explanation as to why that was

with them as well?
A.

Yes.

Did he indicate that he had taken baths

-1221

Q.

What did he say about that?

2

A.

That the bath time was a bonus. They would just sit

3

in the bath and talk and relax.

4

Q.

And when he was saying "they," who was he referring

6

A.

He and Kirsten and Brittney.

7

Q.

And this was at one bath time altogether?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Okay.

5

to?

Going back to the showering a little bit, did

10

you ask him whether or not there was anything sexual involved

11

with that?

12

A.

We did talk about that, yes.

13

Q.

What was his response initially?

14

A.

No, that there was nothing sexual about it.

15

Q.

All right.

16

about that?

Did you ask him any further questions

17

A.

I did.

18

Q.

What did you ask him?

19

A.

Just in reference to what Tracy had told me, that she

20

had wanted to stop and he —

21

had become aroused.

22
23

Q.

Uh-huh.

because she had mentioned that he

Did he indicate that that conversation did in

fact take place?

24

A.

Yes,

25

Q.

And did he indicate to you what his feelings were
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1

about showering?

2

A.

He indicated that he had become aroused, he had began

3

to have man feelings, and they decided not to shower with

4

Brittney anymore.

5
6

Q.

Okay.

So the man feelings were related to Brittney

specifically?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And did he indicate why with Brittney?

9 1

A.

She had started to mature.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Now, specifically regarding the facts of Kirsten's

13

When she was 11?

1

allegati ons, you ultimately went over exactly what she had

14 ! alleged, right?

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

And did he have any specific response to those facts?

17

A.

He indicated that Kirsten was a physical touchy child,

18

and that had laid upon him.

f

J

19

Q.

Okay, in what way laid upon him?

1

20 1

A.

Laid on top of him.

I

21

Q.

Okay, and what about Brittney, did you talk to him

22

specifically about the allegations that Brittney had made?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

About being in bed together?

25

A.

Yes.

-1241

Q.

Did he have anything in response to that?

2

A.

Just that it was common for Brittney to be —

3
4

to lay

between he and Tracy.
Q.

Okay.

Based on the interview and on the information

5

that you gathered, did you make a decision about what to do

6

with the case?

7
8

A.

I did.

I felt that it needed to be presented in front

of the district attorney's office, and we did that.

9

Q.

Okay, and a filing decision was made at that point?

10

A.

Yes.

11

MS. BARTON: No further questions.

12

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

13

Mr. Skordas.

14

MR. SKORDAS: Thank you.

15
16

You may cross examine,

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. SKORDAS:

17

Q.

You present a lot of cases to the district attorneys,

18

don't you?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

In fact, that's your job, isn't it?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

To gather evidence and present the case?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And you say you've done that for about 1500 cases?

25

A.

Probably about that, yes.

-1251

Q.

Pardon me?

2

A.

I think that's about right.

3

Q.

Including at least 1000 children that you interviewed?

4

A.

I would say so.

5

Q.

You understand the importance of making an interview

6

non-leading, I think were your words; is that correct?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

You don't want to put words in a child's mouth,

9

correct?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

You weren't present during the interview between the

12

children and their grandmother, were you?

13

A.

No, I was not.

14

Q.

And you don't know whether she's had any training in

15

how to interview a child such that it's not leading, correct?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

And did you interview her about that?

18

A.

We talked about what she'd asked, yes.

19

Q.

Okay, and did you talk to the kids about what they had

20

told their grandmother?

21

A.

I believe so, yes.

22

Q.

And certainly the grandmother's mode of question was

23

more leading than you would have done through your training,

24

correct?

25

A.

Correct.
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1

Q.

You indicated that you've — well, you've obviously

2

had a great deal of training in the area of child sexual abuse

3

and detection, correct?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

And you understand that there are factors that you

6

also have to weigh in to determine whether a child has in fact

7

been coached or is not telling something that may be true,

8

correct?

9

A.

Okay, yes.

10

Q.

And certainly divorce situations could raise eyebrows

11

in certain circumstances, can't they?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Families where the children would be siding with one

14

parent as opposed to the other, and trying to gain favor with

15

that parent?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

Those are indicators from your training that would

18

cause concern to any skilled investigator about the testimony;

1

19 I is that a fair statement?

1

20

A.

I would say that's a fair statement.

1

21

Q.

There are numerous other ones, too, correct?

1

22

A.

Correct.

1

23

Q.

Including the age of the child, their experience,

1

24
25

things like that?
A.

There's a lot of factors, yes.

I
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1
2

Q.

All right, and you indicated that Mr. Vail came in

when he was asked by you to meet with himf correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

He was cooperative?

5

A.

Yes, he was.

6

Q.

And you gave him a Miranda warning before you talked

7

to him?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And I suppose that's a routine thing that you do when

10

you interview people?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And he waived those rights, correct?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

Talked to you about the problems that he was having

15

with his wife?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

That included some communication problem and some

18

sexual problems?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

His statement to you was transcribed.

21

to have a copy of that with you?

22

A.

I do.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

Do you happen

Would you turn to page 8 of his statement,

specifically starting on line 303.
A.

Okay.

-1351 I thinks it's an issue that this child never mentioned that she
2

was wearing a knee-length nightgown.

3

out the fact that in fact she did.

4

inconsistent statement, and hearsay is admissible if I'm using

5

this evidence to simply rebut that.

6

THE COURT: Very good.

7

ahead.

8

Q.

9

on page —

10

A.

I'm just trying to bring

He was alleging a prior

It's overruled.

You may go

BY MS. BARTON: Read the statement of the social worker
on line 140.

It says, "Only like a nightshirt kind, not a nightgown

11

to your knees."

12

him lick his fingers or did you hear him lick his fingers — "

13

Q.

"And you had underwear on, okay.

Okay, that's —

So you saw

thank you. Mr. Skordas has asked you

14

a couple of questions about indicators that you worked for when

15

—

16

something up.

17

the truth?

18

A.

Body language, consistency.

19

Q.

Were you looking for these indicators with those

20

girls?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Did you find them?

23
24
25

to tell whether a child is fabricating something or making
What about indicators that the child is telling

What kind of indicators do you look for there?

MR. SKORDAS: Your Honor, I'm going to object.

This

witness can't —
MS. BARTON: Your Honor, he opened the door.

He's
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1

asked about this.

2

girls.
THE COURT: Let mei hear from him first, Ms. Barton.

3
4

Please go ahead.
MR. SKORDAS: The witness can't assess the credibility

5
6

He's as•ked about the credibility of these

of a witness

7

THE COURT: Well, no.

8

MR. SKORDAS: That is exactly what she just said.

9

THE COURT: Maybe I better hear from Ms. Barton.

10

MS. BARTON: Yes, your Honor.

On cross examination

11

Mr. Skordas asked her if she detected any indicators that

12

would in his view indicate lack of trustworthiness, and I'm

13

now asking her if she found indicators that would show a

14

likelihood of honesty.

THE COURT: Overruled, you may ask.

15
16
17

It's a topic that he opened.

Q.

BY MS. BARTON: Did you see those indicators in this

case?

18

A.

I believe so.

19

Q.

Now, Mr. Skordas also asked you about taking lots of

20

cases to the district attorney's office.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Are there some cases that you never take?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

What would your reasons for that be?

25

MR. SKORDAS: I guess I'll just continue my objection
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1

on the same basis.
THE COURT: Overruled.

2
3
4

Q.

BY MS. BARTON: Why would you not take a case to the

district attorney/s office?
A.

5
6

She may continue.

If changing statements or evidence that shows there is

enough not to bring the case forward.

7

MS. BARTON: That's all I have.

8

THE COURT: You may cross examine, Mr. Skordas.

9

CROSS EXAMINATION

10

BY MR. SKORDAS:

11
12

Q.

You don't make the decision on whether to file

charges, do you?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

That's made by someone at the district attorney's

15

office, correct?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Or by others, correct?

18

A.

(Inaudible), yes.

19

Q.

You're a fact gathering person for the most part,

20

correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

MR. SKORDAS: That's all I have, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything?

24

MS. BARTON: Just one, one question on that topic.

25

///
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Defendant pled guilty in the Third District, Salt
Lake Department, Tyrone E. Medley, J., to
attempted obstruction of justice for having sold car
used in murder and was ordered to pay restitution.
Defendant appealed restitution order. The Court of
Appeals held that defendant was not required to pay
restitution, absent admission of responsibility for
murder or agreement to pay restitution.

[3] Sentencing and Punishment <®^2130
350Hk2130 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok 1208.4(2))
Restitution statute requires that responsibility for
defendant's criminal conduct be firmly established,
much like a guilty plea, before the court can order
restitution. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i).
•1290 David C. Cundick, Parker, Freestone,
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Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., James H. Beadles, Asst.
Atty. Gen., and Vincent Meister, Deputy Dist.
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Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., BENCH,
and BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION

Reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM:
West Headnotes
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>2130
350Hk2130 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2))
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <@^2138
350Hk2138 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2))
[1] Sentencing and Punishment <®==>2143
350Hk2143 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2))
Defendant who pled guilty to attempted obstruction
of justice but did not admit responsibility for murder
nor agree to pay restitution was not required to pay
restitution to Victim's Reparation Fund for money it
gave to murder victim 's family for counseling.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(a)(i).
[2] Sentencing and Punishment <®=^2100
350Hk2100 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kl208.4(2))
Restitution statute does not ask the trial court to
analyze a defendant's state of mind but, rather, asks
it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing
court. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i).
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^ 1 Ellie Watson appeals the trial court's order
requiring her to pay restitution to the Victim's
Reparation Fund for money it gave to a murder
victim's family for counseling. The State concedes
error. We reverse.
f 2 On July 23, 1996, Lonnie Durazo was killed
and Melissa Fraga was injured.
Watson was
charged with criminal homicide and attempted
criminal homicide because she allegedly drove
codefendants, Quetzalcohual Chapman and Mike
Pierson, to and from the crime scene. Watson was
also charged with obstruction of justice for having
sold the car used in the crime.
Under a plea
bargain, Watson pleaded guilty to attempted
obstruction of justice.
She was sentenced and
ordered, over her objection, "to pay restitution in
such amount (sic) as have been made of the Victim's
Reparation' (sic) Fund relating to the death of
Lonnie Durazo."
[1] K 3 A court may order restitution only if the
defendant has been convicted of a crime that
resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to pay
restitution or admits to the criminal conduct. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 201(4)(a)(i)(Supp.l999)
(stating "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(Cite as: 987 P.2d 1289, *1290)
court shall order that the defendant make restitution
to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to
make restitution as part of a plea agreement").
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of
which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without
an admission of committing the criminal conduct."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 201(l)(b)(Supp.l999).
H 4 The trial court focused on the phrase "criminal
conduct for which the defendant admits" in the
"criminal activities" definition, in determining that
restitution was appropriate:
This court is of the opinion that for 76-3-201(b)
and again focusing on that language "any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to."
In this court's opinion the
defendant did admit to the responsibility of driving
this vehicle. And in this court's opinion also,
[defense counsel], in spite of the fact that you
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am
just of the opinion that there are sufficient facts,
substantial as they may be, which are reflective of
the defendant's state of mind in this particular
case; i.e., hearing the shots, individuals running
towards the vehicle, her admission that she drove
the vehicle away.
In this court's opinion is
sufficient nexus to hold her accountable for
restitution in this particular case and meets the
statutory definition. And even when you apply
the "but for" analysis to that conduct, in this
court's view, she still qualifies to have restitution
imposed.
For those reasons, I am going to
require that the defendant, Ms. Watson, make
restitution in this particular case.
[2] [3] H 5 To conclude that Watson admitted
responsibility for the murder and that there was a
sufficient nexus to hold her accountable to the
victim's family for restitution, the trial court
examined and made inferences about Watson's state
of mind based upon the evidence before it.
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However, the statute is more narrow. It does not
ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of
mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made
to the sentencing court. In other words, the statute
requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct
be firmly established, much like a guilty plea,
before the court can order restitution. See, e.g.,
State v. Voetberg, 99 Or.App. 112, 781 P.2d 387
(1989) (interpreting a restitution statute similar to
Utah's). In Voetberg, the Oregon Court of Appeals
determined that the trial court should not have
ordered the defendant, who admitted the company's
liability in his capacity as president, to pay
restitution because he did not admit personal liability
and he was not determined to be the alter ego of the
*1291 company. See 781 P.2d at 388-89. The
court concluded that a trial court must insure that
formalities of an admission are met before
restitution can be ordered:
For the purposes of determining the basis for
restitution, the admission of a defendant is
essentially the same as a plea of guilty that would
support a conviction, but a judgment of conviction
is not entered because of a plea bargain. Because
such an admission can result in liability for
substantial sums of money,
defendant's
responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be
firmly established.
Id. at 389 (citation omitted). The same rationale
applies here.
Without making inferences as the
trial court did, it cannot be said that Watson
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she
agree to pay restitution. Watson only admitted and
pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for
which there were no pecuniary damages. Thus,
there was no firmly established admission of
responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay
restitution.
f 6 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order
of restitution and remand the case for such further
proceedings as may now be proper.
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